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PUBLICATION NUMBER 20 JULY 1978 
ALL HAZARDS ARE NOT EQUAl. 
While there are no perfect indices to measure trends taking place in 
technology and innovation, the evidence presented by changes in some 
very important indicators strongly suggests that a slowdown has been 
occuring. In teal terms (constant 1972 dollars), research and development 
spending in the United States has been on a plateau of slightly under 
thirty billion dollars a year since 1965. In the private sector, research and 
development, which rose at an annual rate of more than seven percent 
from 1953 to 1957, bas been increasing at a more modest one percent a 
year since. 
The employment of scientists and engineers in industry decreased by 
fifteen thousand in 1975 from 1,046,000 in 1968. Enrollments for 
advanced degrees in science and engineering have represented a steadily 
· shrinking share of college enrollments since 1965. The U.S. Patent Office 
issued fewer patents to U.S. citizens in 1973 than in 1963, but issued 
more than double the number of patents to foreign nationals in 1973 than 
in 1963. 
A key to future trends in innovative activity lies in the commitment to 
basic research, as opposed to overall research and development, which 
includes not only product development but also research dedicated to 
fulfilling regulatory requirements and minimizing liability exposure. 
Federal funding of basic research has declined since 1968 (in constant 
1967 dollars) and industry funding began a modest rate of decline in 1971. 
In its forecast of research and development expenditures for 1977, Battelle 
Columbus Laboratories noted that the shift from basic to pragmatic 
research continues, particularly in industry where the change has been 
toward "defensive" research because of "growing governmental emphasis 
on environmental protection, occupational safety and health, and consumer 
safeguards." To be sure, the overall slowdown in research and development 
outlays is the result of multiple causes, such as the shift in federal spending 
priorities from defense to social welfare programs. 
Mr. Weidenbaum is Director and Mr. Chilton is Assistant Director of the Center for the Study 
of American Business at Washington University- in St. Louis, Missouri. 
©New York Academy of Sciences. Reprinted from THE SCIENCES, Volume 18, Number 6, 
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Government Regulation 
What is the role of government regulation in the slowdown? First, let us 
state the obvious: government regulation often has yielded important 
benefits- less pollution, fewer product hazards, reduced job 
discrimination and other socially desirable objectives. These government 
programs were established in response to rising public expectations about 
business performance. But the worthiness of these social objectives should 
not make the specific methods being used in attempting to achieve them 
totally immune from criticism. 
At first blush, government imposition of socially desirable requirements 
on business through the regulatory process appears to be an inexpensive 
way of achieving national objectives. The practice apparently costs the 
government little and represents no significant direct burden on the 
taxpayer. But the public does not escape paying the cost. Every time, for 
example, that the Environmental Protection Agency imposes a more costly 
(and perhaps less polluting) method of production on any firm, the cost of 
the company's products to the consumer will rise. Similar effects flow 
from the other regulatory efforts, including those involving product safety, 
job health and equal employment opportunity. 
These higher prices, we need to come to recognize, represent the 
~~hidden tax" of regulation which is shifted from the government to the 
consumer. It is not inevitable that every regulatory activity increases 
inflationary pressures. In those instances where regulation generates social 
benefits (such as a healthier and thus more productive work force) in 
excess of the social costs it imposes, inflationary pressures should be 
reduced. But if the costs are ignored and the focus of public policy is only 
on the benefits, it is almost inevitable that the regulation will be pushed 
beyond the point where the benefits equal the costs and into the zone of 
~~overregulation." Overregulation, to an economist, is not an emotional 
term, but merely the shorthand for situations where the costs imposed by 
regulation exceed the benefits from the regulation. 
At times the impact of regulation on the prices that consumers pay is 
direct and visible. For example, in the case of the passenger automobile, 
the federal government has required the producers to incorporate a wide 
variety of specified safety and environmental features. For the average new 
car sold in the U.S., those government-mandated requirements add a cost of 
approximately $666 (or more than seven billion dollars a year for all the new 
vehicles purchased). We are not justified, however, in jumping to either 
extreme conclusion - that there are no offsetting benefits or that the 
benefits are overwhelming. But surely, drivers and their passengers who 
always put on seat belts derive no benefit from the expensive and 
annoying buzzing contraptions mandated by the federal government. 
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Government regulation also pushes up prices indirectly, by increasing 
the overhead costs of producing goods and services. There are more than 
four thousand different types of federal forms which must be filled out, in 
addition to tax and banking forms. Business firms and individuals spend 
more than 143 million hours a year filling them out. Consider these 
examples: A small five-thousand watt radio station in New Hampshire 
spent more than $26 just to mail its application for renewal of its license 
to the Federal Communications Commission. That was before the last 
postal rate increase. An Oregon company, operating three small television 
stations, reported that its license renewal application weighed 45 pounds. 
At the other end of the size spectrum, the Exxon Company is required 
to file more than four hundred reports each year to 45 federal agencies. 
The Standard Oil Company of Indiana maintains 636 miles of computer 
tape just to store the data that it must supply to the Department of 
Energy. 
Economic Growth 
Federal regulation also affects the prospects for economic growth and 
productivity by levying a claim on a rising share of new capital formation. 
This impact is most evident in the environmental and safety areas. 
According to the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, private outlays 
for pollution control in the United States in 1976 were six and a half 
billion dollars higher than would have been the case in the absence of 
federal ecological requirements. Similarly, the McGraw-Hill Department of 
Economics estimates the cost to American industry of meeting the 
occupational health and safety regulations at $3.2 billion in 1976. These 
two programs alone account for about six percent of total capital spendinQ 
in the private sector of the American economy. 
Capital formation is also adversely affected by the uncertainty about the 
future of regulations governing the introduction of new processes and 
products. Take this example from the energy area: A task force of the 
President's Energy Resources Council, in evaluating the requirement for 
environmental impact statements, claims that the major uncertainty was 
not whether a project would be allowed to proceed, but rather the length 
of time that it would be delayed pending the issuance of an environmental 
impact statement that would stand up in court. In assessing the overall 
impact of government regulatory activity on the establishment of a new 
energy industry, the task force concluded" ... some of these requirements 
could easily hold up or permanently postpone any attempt to build and 
operate a synthetic fuels plant." 
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In the occupational safety and health area, professional safety staffs are 
often diverted from their basic function of training workers in safer 
operating procedures to filling out forms, posting notices, and meeting 
other essentially bureaucratic requirements. And so, we find safety 
personnel answering such trivial questions as: How big is a hole? When is a 
roof a floor? How frequently must spittoons be cleaned? Of greater 
concern, no doubt, is the detail of the regulations. Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) directives, for example, contain very 
specific requirements for virtually every piece of equipment used in the 
production of steel. These requirements range from such major items as 
coke ovens all the way down to such minutiae as the ladders used in plants 
and the mandatory 42-inch height from the floor for portable fire 
extinguishers. The results measured by any improvement in safety are 
almost invariably disappointing. The number of workdays lost to injury 
and illness per one hundred workers in American industry rose from 53.1 
in 1974 to 54.4 in 1975. 
Innovation 
The hidden cost of government regulation that potentially is perhaps 
the most costly of all is a reduced rate of introduction of new products 
and manufacturing processes. The longer it takes for a new product or 
production technique to be approved by a government agency- or the 
more costly the approval process- the less likely that the new product 
will be created. In any event, innovation will be delayed. The banning or 
forcing out of existing products likewise has a negative effect on the 
incentive to proceed with new products that may be rejected on similar 
grounds. 
The saccharin case, while the best known, is not an isolated example of 
proposed product bans based on the zero risk approach to health and 
safety. In August 1975, the National Cancer Institute reported that the 
solvent trichlorethylene, known as TCE, might be a possible cause of 
cancer. TCE at the time was used in decaffeinated coffee. The government 
used a generous dose of the chemical on test animals- the equivalent of a 
human being drinking fifty million cups of decaffeinated coffee every day 
for an entire lifetime. But did the industry laugh at or ignore the 
government's report? Hardly. With the cyclamate episode still firmly in 
mind and a saccharin ban being seriously considered, one major producer 
quickly changed to another chemical. 
Or, turning to the chemical industry- one of the largest technically 
oriented sectors of the American economy - more than twenty federal 
laws c<>ver the regulation of chemicals, ranging from the Consumer 
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Product Safety Act and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act to the Clean Air, Clean Water, and Solid Waste 
Disposal Acts. A newcomer to the scene is the Toxic Substances 
Control Act (Tosca) of 1976. The concern within the industry is that 
Tosca will have a severe impact on the entire industry in the same way 
the 1962 Food and Drug Act Amendments affected the pharmaceutical 
manufacturers. 
Sam Peltzman of the University. of Chicago has estimated that the 
1962 amendments to the Food and Drug Act are delaying the 
introduction of effective drugs by about four years, as well as leading to 
higher prices for drugs. Due in large part to the stringent drug approval 
regulations, the U.S. is no longer the leader in introducing new 
medicines. According to William Wardell of the University of Rochester 
School of Medicine, we were the thirtieth country to approve the anti-
asthma drug meta-proterenol, the thirty-second to approve the anti-cancer 
drug adriamycin, the fifty-first to approve the anti-tuberculosis drug 
rifampin, and the sixty-fourth to approve the anti-bacterial drug 
co-trimaxazole. 
Henry Grabowski and John Vernon of Duke University report that 
the more stringent Food and Drug Administration regulation of 
pharmaceuticals over recent years has been a major cause of higher costs, 
time lags and rising risk in pharmaceutical innovation. They contend that 
increased regulation alone accounts for the doubling in the cost of 
developing and introducing a new chemical entity in the U.S. What's 
more, they conclude that innovation has become increasingly 
concentrated in the large, multi-national drug companies, apparently 
because these firms are better able to bear the additional costs and risks 
of innovation than smaller firms and, in addition, because they can shift 
resources on a worldwide basis. 
The shift, away from basic research toward evolutionary or applied 
research is already evident among chemical manufacturers. Chemical and 
Engineering News (October 3, 1977) noted that "DuPont, the U.S. 
chemical industry's leader in research and development spending, has, 
over the past few years, shown a notable retrenchment in its real-dollar 
research and development support. In the process, the company has 
shifted many of its research and development efforts from new venture 
research to work on established product lines ... " 
In addition, "defensive" research is competing with basic research for 
the research and development budget dollar. Monsanto found that 
thirteen percent of its research was spent on compliance and therefore 
reorganized its research and development efforts into two parallel 
organizations, one traditional and a new Environmental Policy Staff. 
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Pesticide manufacturers form a subgroup of the chemical industry 
that has already experienced the effects of direct regulation under the 
Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act. Harold L. Straube, vice 
president of Stauffer Chemical and at one time president of the 
National Agricultural Chemicals Association, believes that "government 
meddling in terms of excessive regulation has skyrocketed the costs of 
doing business to a level we never thought possible ... a climate is 
being developed in which research and development could grind to a 
halt." He noted that in 1967 the cost to discover and commercialize 
a new pesticide was three million four hundred thousand dollars and the 
average time lag was five years but the 1976 figures are eight million 
dollars and eight years. 
Delaney Amendment 
Surely the Delaney Amendment to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
is worthy of some attention as a prime example of the futility of a zero 
risk approach to health and safety regulation. That statute prohibits the 
use of any chemical substance (in any amount) as a food additive if 
that substance has been found, by "appropriate" tests, to induce cancer 
in human beings or laboratory animals. A major problem becoming 
increasingly evident is that scientific progress over the last twenty years 
has brought about a ten thousand to one million times improvement in 
the ability to measure "any amount." 
The requirement to enforce the Delaney Amendment led the FDA to 
ban the use of acrylonitrile (AN) in beverage bottles effective January 
1978. Since tests by Monsanto (the company with the largest 
investment in the AN bottle) indicated a migration of an average of 
ten parts per billion from the bottle to the beverage after six months 
at room temperature, AN must be considered to be a "food additive" 
from the FDA's point of view. Thus the only question is whether AN 
has been "appropriately" tested and adjudged a carcinogen. In banning 
the AN bottle, FDA commissioner Donald Kennedy said, "The record 
shows AN is a frank teratogen in the rat, a tumorigen and probable 
carcinogen in the rat, a possible carcinogen in man, and a mutagen in 
several test systems. Under these circumstances, it is inconceivable that 
the scientific community could recognize that any level of AN has 
been shown through scientific procedures to be safe." 
The manufacturer m.ust prove that there is a "safe" level of a 
"probable" carcinogen that may be consumed by human beings. 
Monsanto states that the lowest level of feeding that showed harm to 
animals requires, in human terms, that a child drink three thousand 
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bottles of soda every day for life in order to duplicate the test 
conditions. The company further points out the impossibility of 
producing products with zero risk as carcinogens through the example 
of lettuce. Lettuce contains nickel, a metal which causes cancer and 
would therefore, if commercially produced, have to be banned under 
the Delaney Amendment. The fact that we do not drop face down in 
our salad bowls indicates that the human organism must have a 
tolerance for some level of nickel - how much is the serious but 
unanswered scientific question. 
The inconsistency in federal policy, however, is awesome. Compare 
the counsel of perfection implicit in the Delaney Amendment's attitude 
toward food additives with the government's position on tobacco. The 
American Cancer Society recently has forecasted three hundred ninety 
thousand cancer deaths in the United States in 1978. Nearly one in 
four of these deaths will be from lung cancer, twenty percent of which 
is due to smoking. What is so incongruous is that the U.S. government 
subsidizes a proven carcinogen through its price support of tobacco 
administered by the Department of Agriculture. 
Common Sense 
What action might the optimist envision? First of all, a large measure 
of common sense is needed on the part of our elected officials and civil 
serv~nts responsible for drafting and enforcing regulations. They must 
know that a totally risk-free environment is an impractical objective. 
Literally realized, it would put us back ir:1 the Stone Age, which was 
hardly a safe period for human existence. 
Any realistic appraisal must acknowledge that important and positive 
benefits have resulted from many of the government's regulatory 
activities. It should also be realized that the American people have a 
right to expect business to respond to the public's desire for less 
pollution, fewer product hazards, and protection from unknown health 
hazards. But the worthiness of social objectives does not justify 
government closely regulating every facet of private behavior. Indeed, 
the experience with existing governmental efforts shows that further 
expansion of government involvement in the detail of business decision-
making is likely to be self-defeating. 
To be sure, the exercise of judgment in regulatory matters can involve 
striking a balance in some extremely difficult areas, literally affecting 
human life. As a former commissioner of food and drugs, Alexander 
Schmidt, has said, "In FDA decisions, as in all aspects of human 
endeavor, we must accept the probability of nonexistence of absolute 
7 
safety." He goes on to raise some very difficult questions: Just where 
and when does one draw the line in weighing demonstrable benefit 
against theoretical risk? Who is to draw the line? Government or 
industry or the individual consumer? Schmidt criticized the anti-
cancer clauses in existing food safety laws because, literally interpreted, 
they leave no room for scientific judgment, calling for zero risk from 
all ·new food ingredients. 
There is a real need for scientists in industry and the universities to 
take part in the debates on regulation. William Baker of Bell 
Laboratories has suggested that industry and university researchers 
should work as equal partners in defining the appropriate regulatory 
systems. He says that such a partnership 11WOuld help overcome the 
often negative influence of special interest groups and of naive 
generalizations about science and engineering in setting regulatory 
policies." 
Restraint 
A new attitude of restraint in imposing additional regulations on the 
private sector would lower the risk and the cost of research and 
development by business. We need to adopt sensible, operational notions 
of practical threshold levels and of toxicological insignificance. To put 
it bluntly, all hazards are not equal. Government policy needs to make 
such distinctions as between hidden and visible hazards, voluntary and 
involuntary hazards, easily avoidable and hard-to-avoid hazards, remote 
and commonplace hazards, and negligible and severe hazards. 
Such a new attitude would have a salutary effect on the pace of 
technological innovation and scientific progress in the Unitetl States. 
The benefits would be widespread. They would include lower prices 
for American consumers, greater job opportunities for workers and 
ultimately an improved quality of life for the average citizen. 
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